1: Stanford University AF15 East China AF15

668

/For details of Communist policies toward various sociological, political, and economic aspects of present-day China, see the entire text in category 116./

669 and the Fengtien (South Manchuria) Clique led by Chang Tso-lin. After 1923, Feng Yü-hsiang, until then the chief lieutenant of Wu P'ei-fu, became an independent and additional element in the dominance of Peking. Both Tuan and Feng were natives of Anhwei but operated largely outside the East China Region.

F. Shanghai and the Nationalist Revolution

669
668 During 1923, the founder and leader of the Kuomintang, Sun Yat-sen, reached agreement with representatives of the Soviet Union for its material help in reorganizing the Kuomintang on Communist Party lines and aiding it in the achievement of national unification and independence. Members of the Chinese Communist Party, founded two years before in Shanghai, were admitted into the Kuomintang and permitted to conduct the major share of the propaganda and grass roots organizational campaigns. In the East China Region, these efforts were most heavily concentrated on the industrial workers of Shanghai. Particular attention was paid to organizing them into unions, propagandizing for labor benefits, and indoctrinating labor in nationalistic and

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

669 anti-imperialistic ideas.[35]

668 In the course of this campaign, a demonstration held May 30, 1925 to protest the death of a worker in a strike against one of the city's Japanese-owned mills was fired on by police of the International Settlement, killing several marchers. Communist labor leaders took advantage of natural Chinese resentments to promote a general anti-imperialist movement marked by strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations against Britain and Japan. This action aided greatly in stirring up enthusiasm for the radical Kuomintang program then being disseminated in Canton and for the Northern Expedition which set out from that city a year later to unite all

---

35. The history of the reorganization of the Kuomintang, its alliance with the Soviet Union, the beginnings of the Communist Party and subsequent events is recounted from a number of points of view in MacNair, op. cit.,; T'ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, London, G. Routledge and sons, 1930; Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, rev. ed., Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1953; Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1953; and Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951.

669 China and free it from foreign control. The
• 668 May 30th incident helped to swell the ranks of the Communist-led unions. On Marcy 22, 1927, the unions were able to seize control of Shanghai as a small Nationalist army approached the city. The Kuomintang army was welcomed into the city by the labor forces, but it was evident that they intended to maintain at least a hand in controlling the city and that they were in sympathy with the Communist-dominated left-wing of the Kuomintang government at Wuhan, which had split with the more conservative majority of the party elsewhere. On orders from Chiang Kai-shek, the reinforced army within Shanghai struck without warning at the labor forces on April 12, 1927, slaughtering thousands of labor union members, their Communist and leftist leaders, and their worker army, which had buried its arms on Comintern orders. The action was preceded by a conference between Chiang and the business leaders of Shanghai, who had been shocked by the excesses of the Wuhan Government's appeal for peasant and labor uprisings. With the support of the business element and the warlords within the ranks of the Kuomintang, Chiang was able to achieve leadership of the party and drive the left-wing government from Wuhan. He turned the revolution to the right. The Russian advisors were expelled from the country and the Communists from the Kuomintang.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

G. Shanghai and Opposition to the Kuomintang

668 As the Kuomintang turned toward the right and shortly afterward became the governing power in China, Shanghai became one of the principal centers for movements out of sympathy with the one-party government. Many of Shanghai's business and professional men were leaders of the Nationalist Salvation Movement, which from 1935 to 1937 condemned the government's policy of appeasement toward Japan and failure to institute democracy in the country.[36] Shanghai was also a primary center of the leftists, socially oriented literary expression of the late twenties and the thirties. Among its most noted exponents were two natives of Chekiang -- by which Shen Yen-ping, better known by the pen-name of Mao Tun, and Chou Shu-jen, who has become universally famous under his pen-name of Lu Hsün (Hsin). Mao Tun is currently one of the leading Chinese Communist authors. Lu Hsün at the time of his death in 1936 was the most popular writer in China, especially among the students. His novel The Story of Ah Q is a major classic of modern Chinese literature.

---

36. See P.M.A. Linebarger, The China of Chiang K'ai-shek (sic): A Political Study, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1941.

1;Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

668 Though Lu Hsün never joined the Communist Party, he had become sympathetic with it in the last years of his life. The anniversary of his death is celebrated and publicized by the Communist regime; he and his works are lauded in the Communist press; and his home in Shao-hsing, Chekiang, and his grave in Shanghai have become national shrines.[37]

648 H. Shantung and the Boxer Rebellion

From the end of the nineteenth century until 1929, Shantung was repeatedly the object of foreign aggression. Initially and for the most part, the aptest pupil of the West, Japan, was the aggressor. But the inroads of Western powers themselves were the first to rouse Chinese hatred and reaction.

The Shantung peninsula was bombarded and occupied by Japanese forces during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). They had not been withdrawn when Germany seized the pretext of the murder of two German missionarie in Shantung to sieze Tsingtao as a naval base in November 1897. Railway and mining concessions in the province were also wrung from the Chinese government. When the Japanese forces in Wei-hai-wei (Weihaiwei) were withdrawn in May 1898, the British moved in

37. See, for example, the translation of an article from the Communist press by Feng Hsüeh-feng, "Lu Hsün: His Life and Thought," Current Background, 217.

I:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

648 Versailles Treaty negotiations, Japan skillfully maneuvered the other Allied representatives into officially confirming her special position in Shantung. When news of the Versailles Treaty provision validating Japanese control of Shantung reached China in 1919, the students instituted a protest demonstration that constituted a turning point in modern
• 668 Chinese history. Known as the May Fourth Movement, the demonstration grew into a national protest and anti-Japanese boycott joined by bankers, merchants, and other articulate sections of the country. It forced the resignation of the warlord government of Tuan Ch'i-jui, moved the Chinese delegation at Versailles to refuse to sign the treaty, instigated a rising tide of nationalism at home, and turned China away from trust and hope in the Western powers and toward a search for salvation through the aid of the Soviet Union and the use of Communist organization and methods. From the May Fourth Movement can also be traced the injection of strength and substance into the Kuomintang and the birth of the Communist Party. The current Communist regime recognizes its debt to the May Fourth Movement, and views it as the watershed of the revolutionary stream which

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

668 carried the Communists to victory.[38]

648 Though China won back control of Shantung through negotiations initiated at the Washington Conference (1921-22), Japan maintained her economic interests in the province. On the basis that these and her citizens were threatened, Japan moved troops into Shantung in 1927 and thwarted the Nationalist army's drive through the province toward Peking in 1927 and 1928. Only after a full-scale battle at Tsinan in 1928 did the Japanese give way and permit part of the Nationalist forces to move north and seize the old capital of China. Japan withdrew her troops on May 20, 1929, but the widespread Chinese boycott on Japanese goods which had been instigated by the Tsinan incident continued through the summer of that year.

Shantung was once more subject to Japanese military assault and occupation in 1937. Before Chinese troops were driven out of the province the following year, they won one of China's few World War II victories, at T'ai-erh-chuang.

---

38. The student role in the May Fourth Movement and subsequent events are described in Kiang (Chiang) Wen-han, The Chinese Student Movement, New York, Kings Crown Press, 1948. On the reorientation of the Kuomintang, the rise of the Chinese Communist Party, and Russia's role in both, see references, footnote 35.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

642 Wang Ching-wei was established with its capital at Nanking as the political authority for all China. In reality, the new government like the old ones it displaced had no real power, attracted no important Chinese leaders to its standard other than Wang, and derived no real support or recognition from the Chinese people.[42]

IV. THE RISE AND VICTORY OF COMMUNISM

A. Birth of the Party in Shanghai

•668 The East China Region and particularly Shanghai played an important part in the rise of Communism in China. Approximately midway between two other centers of intellectual ferment and radical thought in the early republican period -- Peking and Canton -- Shanghai was the natural meeting place of
665 representatives of the new ideas. In September 1920, a meeting of some eight intellectuals discussed the formation of a Communist Party in China, and at a larger gathering the next year in the same city, the Chinese

42. Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 183-210; and George E. Taylor, The Struggle for North China, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 159-62, 176-77.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF13~~ AF15

•668 726 The fall of Shanghai to Japan in 1937 and of the rest of the East China Region the following year created a new situation for the Communists. They had become experts at guerrilla warfare in the countryside, and the Party seized the opportunity of the war to establish guerrilla bases in the rural areas where neither the Kuomintang nor the Japanese exerted any real control. At the end of 1937, remnants of the former soviets in Fukien and Kiangsi became the nucleus of the New Fourth Army. Largely Communist-led, it was sanctioned by the Chungking Government to operate in the area against the Japanese. Suspecting with good cause that the Communist leadership was at least equally interested in laying the groundwork for a post-war comeback as in fighting the Japanese, the Central Government ordered the army to move north of the Yangtze River at the end of 1940. While the army was enrouted, it was attacked by Kuomintang troops in January 1941. The action resulted in heavy casualties, capture of the army commander Yeh T'ing, and the end of what little co-operation had existed between the Kuomintang and Communist parties.[51]

---

51. See Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 110-21, Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China, New York, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., pp. 20-21, 314-15, and Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China, New York, Alfred Knopf, 1943, pp. 247-398.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

•668
726

Following this incident, the Central Government disbanded the New Fourth Army, but it continued to operate and expand under Communist aegis in the East China Region and west of it along the Yangtze River until the end of the war. The army functioned not as a unit but as a collection of separate bands maintaining scattered rural bases isolated from one another by Japanese forces concentrated in the cities and communication centers. In Shantung and northern Chekiang, a similar pattern of Communist operation was effected by the Communist Eighth Route Army from 1938 on.[52]

The nature of these armies' existence and lack of independent finances necessitated that the guerrilla forces cultivate close relations with the people. They were encouraged to participate in Communist-sponsored local governments.

Rents due absentee landlords were suspended; taxes on the poorer peasants were lowered; and producer co-operatives were organized for the benefit of the armies and

---

52. See Stein, op. cit., pp. 324, 328-30, and map facing p. 458.

1;Stanford U, S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

•668
726 local population. [53]

669 E. Victory of the Communist Party

At the end of the war, Communist forces were scattered throughout the East China Region with the exception of southern Chekiang and Fukien. These troops immediately began to expand their areas of control by accepting the surrender of Japanese occupying forces and came into conflict with Kuomintang troops bent on the same mission. Central Government orders to the Communists to desist in this operation had no affect, and a full-scale civil war was soon in progress throughout China. [54]

A Kuomintang offensive from July 1946 to July 1947 drove the bulk of the Communist

---

53. See Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 116-23, 159-75; Stein op. cit., pp. 333-41; and U. S. Office of Strategic Services, The Guerrilla Front in North China, Washington, D.C., 1943 pp. 14, 20-21.

54. The names, dates, and campaigns connected with the Communist victory are largely taken from a Communist source, which is accurage in regard to these facts insofar as can be determined by checking against other, scattered sources: Liao Kai-lung, From Yenan to Peking, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1954, pp. 3-4, 8-11, 15116, 18, 21, 32, 36-38, 49-54, 60-65, 89-91, 101-04, 107.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

565
178
517

unions, the peasant associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectuals began their new careers.

178
701

During this period of social and political disorder, military men began to gain power, obtaining offices by virtue of their military success. Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampao) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaign against the warlords. In the war against Japan the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced. A military career has now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their popular success to their military skill, suggest the prestige granted military men in the modern period.

[874]

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

565
668

The Chinese Communists interpret the existing social structure from a Marxist viewpoint and extoll the ideal of a classless society. Their belief that the transition to a classless society is inevitable justifies the liquidation of certain surviving classes.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

565
668

A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949), Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese nationals into those who because of their anti-revolutionary character and their "crimes against the Chinese nation" were deprived of the right to be numbered among the People, and those who were to enjoy all the rights of the People. In the first group were included the Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek, "bureaucratic capitalists" such as H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, "feudalistic" landlords, and a host of other anti-Communist leaders. The second group consisted of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeois, and the national bourgeois. Workers were considered the elite of the nation; the peasants were to be converted into rural workers through collectivization of agriculture, or into urban workers through the development of industry; the petty bourgeois were needed during the New Democratic Stage and were to be "re-educated" in the process of reconstruction; and the national bourgeois, once "enslaved" by bureaucratic capitalism, were now "free" to contribute to the industrialization of China. Mao's classification of the Chinese population and his stipulation of the task of each class at the New Democratic Stage formed the conceptual basis from 1949 to 1954 for the Communist policy toward each of the classes.

565
668

The convocation of the National People's Congress in 1954 is considered by the Chinese Communists as the conclusion of the New Democratic St age and the beginning of a transitional stage which will lead China to socialism. Land reform is completed and the landlords as a class are eliminated, the wings of the bourgeois industrialists and merchants have been clipped by the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and the "ideology of the working class" has been established in all sectors of China.

B. The New Social Ladder

The Communists distinguish between persons "from the working class" and those "possessing the ideology of the working class." They acknowledge that not all Communists are from the working class but that those who have accepted its ideology belong to it. By the same logic, the working-class character of the People's Liberation Army is fixed. The Communists say that, since the People's Liberation Army is led by the working class, viz., the Communist Party, although the bulk of the soldiers and commanders may not be from the working class, the army remains of the working class. Conversely, many workers may not possess the ideology of the working class. The Communists explain that most Chinese workers are fresh from the villages where "feudalistic ideas" abound and therefore have not had time to acquire the ideology of the working class.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

•68 56 The classification of people according to the ideology they profess is one of the underlying principles governing the activities of Communist-sponsored organizations where membership cuts across class lines. The New Democratic Youth Corps, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Young Pioneers, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the Democratic Women's Federation, the labor unions, and the study circles at schools and in factories help to disseminate Communist ideology.

Participation in these mass organizations, whether voluntary or compulsory, serves to separate the individual from his family, absorbing his time and energy outside the family circle. Enforcement of the Marriage Law, principally through the promotion and supervision of the Democratic Women's Federation, encourages women to leave the confines of the family. The recruitment of candidates for institutions of high learning and the assignment of jobs to graduates when they have completed their education also serve to uproot the individual from his immediate environment and make him dependent for advancement on the Communist regime. The weakening of family loyalty forces the individual to look toward the mass organizations sponsored by the Communists, who regard the Party itself as a desirable substitute for the traditional social structure. Since the

668 individual relies on mass organizations for
156 political advancement, which is the prerequisite for economic and social betterment, the mass organizations are most important for the stabilization of society under the current regime. The regime exercises the power to control the career expectancies of the members of mass organizations, reward the achievement of those who work for the goals of the Party leadership, and punish with ostracism or more severe penalties those who rebel against the order For the first time since the abolition of the imperial examination system, a main channel of social advancement has emerged. The mastery of an officially approved body of doctrine is the quickest road to social advancement. The Communist channel of social advancement leads to the selection of conformists. This state of affairs resembles, to some extent, that which prevailed in monarchical times when the mastery of dogmas contained in the classics and their commentaries was the prerequisite to success in the imperial examinations.

668 The Communist regime has found it
178 necessary to promote as replacements for the old ruling group Communist-reformed and Communist-trained administrative, technical, and scientific personnel. Compared with traditional social mobility, the new social mobility does not spring from ideals embodied in Chinese culture but from expedient manipulation by the Communist Party.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

668
178

The development of industry, waterway and irrigation projects, the settlement of the Northwest, and the nationalization and collectivization of many enterprises may conceivably absorb a good portion of the ambitious younger generation. If social mobility continues to depend on Party loyalty, purges may be used to secure loyalty, to provide a flow of scapegoats for grievances which accumulate under a totalitarian system, and to furnish opportunities for advancement for the coming generation, whose continued devotion to the regime is crucial to its survival. But to date in the East China Region the purge of local cadres and officials at the regional level has been mainly limited to the elimination of "old social elements" rather than to the "revolutionaries" themselves.[13]

---

13. Consult the chapter on Political Dynamics in this handbook.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

582
671

(1)...The abolition of arbitrary and compulsory marriage and the putting into effect of freedom of marriage for men and women.
(2)...The abolition of the feudal system of marriage...based on the superiority of man over woman, and the putting into effect..of monogamy, and equal rights for both sexes.
(3)...The abolition of the feudal system of marriage, which neglects the interests of the children, and the putting into effect of the New Democratic system of marriage, which protects the lawful interests of women and children.[11]

684
688

In propagandizing and implementing the Marriage Law, the regime struck against the old authoritarianism of the family head, child marriages, mistreatment of women and discrimination against them as inferior to men, and the mistreatment of children by parents. Wives, especially wives of arranged marriages, were encouraged to seek divorce from intolerant, unrepentant husbands. However, if husbands could be made to adopt the new attitude toward women, partners of arranged marriages were urged to remain united.

---

9. (continued) magazines and newspapers, and should be evaluated accordingly.

10. See comment of American editors of C.B., 136, p. 3.

11. "Document 7," C.B., 236, pp. 22-29.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

To help traditionally-minded families attain the new Communist-established goal of "democracy" and "harmony," family "struggle" meetings were arranged under cadre supervision. Each member was pressed to confess his own past sins and suffering and to help other family members to remember theirs. The particular transgressions sought out for exposure, condemnation, redress, and rectification were the mistreatment and beating of wives by husbands, similar behavior by mothers-in-law against daughters-in-law, and interference by parents in young people's free choice of marriage partners. Much was made in the Communist press of the suicides or murder of women and young people, attributed to the old feudal system of marriage."[12]

Whatever the humanitarian by-products, the Marriage Law aimed at a basic change in Chinese society with two utilitarian purpose in view. One was to change the popular basis of loyalty from the family to the state. The other was to free the Chinese woman from her preoccupation with the home and children so that she might become a laborer in the field and factory. These aims were quite openly expressed.

---

12. See especially C.B., 273, pp. 1-3; 236, pp. 4-14; and Survey of the China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, American Consulate, 932, p. iv; hereafter cited as S.C.M.P. The same conditions apply to this source as to Current Background; see footnote 8.

668 462 For instance, an article in the Peking Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao [China Youth] on the correct attitude toward parents, asserts that under the Confucian system with its emphases on filial piety, parents had the right to regard their children as private property and demand sacrifices of them. Under the new regime, the article pointed out, "children are not the private property of their parents, but belong first of all to the state and to the people, and... the interests of the people should be the highest criterion governing our actions toward our parents."[13]

562 668 An editorial in the People's Daily in March 1955 notes that remnant feudal ideologies still obstructed "the participation of women in Socialist construction and various political activities." The editorial then goes on to state that it is in order to promote the political and production zeal of women that their rights must be promoted and protected and the Marriage Law implemented.[14] Various comments on the Marriage Law inspired by the regime stress Lenin's dictum that sex relationships and family problems are not individual or small affairs but matters of great social, economic, and political significance.

13. S.C.M.P., 973, p. 31.
14. Ibid., 106, p. 15.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

family income derived from labor or property in the home village. The usual source of income at home was from agriculture.[53]

Although the economic status of emigrant families ranged from poor to wealthy, the overseas communities were on the whole wealthier than non-emigrant neighboring villages. The excess of the wealthier families' dual income was largely invested in land and houses.[54] When the Communist took over the area, they were faced with the problem of what attitude ought to be taken toward these landlord families whose income from abroad was a vital source of foreign exchange for the government.

Evidently, no special privilege or status was initially allowed members of these families, and their real property was expropriated on the same basis as that of any other element considered to be exploitive by the regime. On the other hand, the government exerted every effort to influence members of overseas families to write letters to their relatives abroad, setting forth the benefits of land reform and Communist reconstruction in order to woo overseas sympathy and investments in every way possible.[55]

---

53. Ibid., pp. 58-85, 106-23.
54. Ibid., p. 110.
55. C.B., 211, p. 40.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

457 668 The Communists did gain a favorable response from a part of the overseas element, but it was apparently not up to Communist needs and expectations, for various experiments and temporary shifts have marked the regime's subsequent policy toward the overseas Chinese and their dependents in China. New efforts to attract their sympathy were initiated in early 1955. Much publicity was given to the reclassification of overseas landlords as "no longer enemies of the state" before the expiration of the five-year probationary period. Buildings expropriated from overseas Chinese for government use were reportedly being returned to their former owners or paid for. The press reiterated the theme that measures were being taken to assure the right to ownership of overseas remittances and their delivery into the proper hands.[56]

D. The Pace of Reform

185 596 In the pace of family reform, the East China Region is probably not as far behind the North and Northeast regions as in other changes instututed by the Communist regime. Although the North and Northeast regions have been longer under Communist control, industrialization and modern city life with their influences for change in family form and function have a longer history in Shanghai than elsewhere in China. The rural

56. See section entitled "Overseas Chinese," in S.C.M.P. during the first six months of 1955; for instance, 1024, pp. 13-15.

national holidays were increasingly observed -- and like the town dwellers city workers tried to return to their family villages for at least one of the holidays. Another link to one's native place was the system of clubs composed of those city-dwellers who had a common provincial origin; the clubs operated hostels and sometimes arrangements for mutual-aid. Secret societies provided another focus of social life, particularly in the towns and cities. Their rituals passports and secret signs of greeting were all subordinate to their basic aim, which was to provide members with security-through assosi ation with an insurance against the hazards of a disintegrating and increasingly predatory society.

It will be noted that the ties of kinship and custom were strong even between the large modern cities and the farm villages. The ways of life tended increasingly to diverge yet one of the strongest cohesive forces of all was the common set of attitudes and values which even when change has been accounted for held together all Chinese of village and town and city.

II. THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNISM

In discussing Communist efforts to alter the Chinese way of life, it should be stressed that our material is unsatisfactory. Statistics, declarations, news releases -- all give few realistic details of life in the villages under Communist domination, andmost refugees from Communist China have come from the cities.

First of all, the farmer's annual routine is basically unchanged. Pilot collectives are in

668 operation, but these are few and have no immediate bearing on the farmer's work year. The most striking change in the farmer's life is the new network of associations which the government has imposed upon him and the daily barrage of advice and exhortation to which he is subjected. No longer does he cultivate his land in the manner of his ancestors with the assistance of his family, his clan, and his neighbors. He no longer sets the periods of work and of rest. The Communist leadership is determined that the peasant shall be transformed in three ways: (1) he must be made to produce more, (2) he must become a politically conscious, active supporter of the Communist regime and (3) his attitudes and values must be radically changed.

668 241 The instrument of this transformation, which is visible and active in the villages is the Party cadre. Party cadres act as the eyes, the ears and the mouths of authority.[14] They are called upon to take the leadership in organizing production and to participate in all types of farm work, such as mobilizing the peasants for cultivation, teaching new farming methods distributing new seed performing grain requisitioning helping in plant building and repairing dikes etc."[15] The village cadres have been mainly outsiders "foreigners," but the Party has recently been recruiting youths from specific localities and training them to return there as cadres. The

14. Walter E. Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control, Harvard Russian Research Center 1952. p. 25.

15. Gourlay op. cit., p. 28.

668 241 cadre was the instrument of land redistribution and brought into the countryside the first major change decreed by Peking. The cadre organized the Peasants' Association in the village and manipulates its meetings and its officers It was the cadre who worked up sentiment and organized the "speak bitterness" meetings in the days of the Land Reform Movement -- occasions used to the full to attack the old familial order in the villages. It is the cadre who organizes the "struggle meetings" in which villagers are made to engage in criticism and self-criticism in order to undermine the old values and instill the new.

The cadres also pushed the organization of "mutual-aid teams" for the sharing of labor and equipment, an effort that struck at the familial organization of farm labor and apparently met with serious difficulties.[16] More recently the cadre has been the instrument for the concerted attempt to build producer co-operatives in the countryside. In such major efforts as the attempt to put Hunan rice farming on a two-crop basis (hitherto only done further south), the cadres were reportedly responsible for training 100,000 farmers.[17]

873 208 The cadre carried on the effort to destroy traditional mores. He publicizes the new marriage law, discourages or prevents arranged marriages,

16. W. W. Rostow The Prospects of Communist China, Cambridge, 1954, p. 84.

17. Reported by New China News Agency, Changsha, April 20 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), No. 1036, April 28, 1955.

1:Stanford U. S-4 5 1956 AF 15 East China
AF15

208 lectures on sanitation, and sometimes with the
873 help of radio, films, and mobile theatrical units dramatizes the issues of the day, the need for the farmer to sacrifice, to send his sons to the army, to contribute labor to community projects, to inform on his neighbors, to buy bonds, and so forth. The cadre establishes "winter schools" in which the peasants are given intensive political indoctrination practical training, and instruction in reading and writing. Hunan reported that 2,500,000 peasants were enrolled in these schools in the winter of 1955.[18]

425 The age-old drive of the vigorous peasant to
668 increase his family's land holdings is checked by fear lest he be re-classified as a "rich peasant" and be subject to higher taxes and other pressures. Yet what the Communists deplore as the peasant's "spontaneous capitalistic tendency" has not been crushed and the landholdings of the more enterprising grow in size.[19]

474 The effort to force various forms of co-opera-
668 tive work has not been completely successful.

> "...when a serious team-use of labor, tools and farm animals was attempted, a variety of unsatisfactory results emerged; quarrels among the families interfered with efficient output; no one assumed responsibility for the upkeep of communal property; the claims of inefficient members violated the sense of equity of the more efficient..."[20]

---

18. People's Daily, Jan. 30, 1955; SCMP 984, pp. 30-31.

19. Rostow op. cit., p. 152, cites the Peking People's Daily, Feb. 15, 1954.

20. Rostow, op. cit., p. 84.

[p. 223]

1:Stanford, U. S-4. 5 1956 AF 15 East China
AF15

668 517 369 Yet the villagers' way of life has been greatly altered by the intervention of the government, through the cadres, in all social, economic and political activities. The pressure to conform, at least outwardly, is formidable. Self-chosen leisure-time activities are few, meetings occupy a great deal of time and attendance at harangues by Party cadres, entertainment furnished by traveling theatrical groups (all with their ideological message) take up more of his leisure. The slack winter season may now find him in winter school or involved in a community work project directed by the local cadre.

668 369 Settlement of accounts before the New Year holiday means payment of taxes and the sale to the government of most of the balance of the farmer's grain, for which he receives coupons. The cadres carry this out at the village level.[21] The New Year festival itself is characterized by some traditional activities, modified by some new features to help promote government aims. The peasant may buy New Year's pictures to decorate his house, but they will probably be romanticized portraits of Mao and other Communist heroes rather than the colorful deities of former days.[22] He may decorate his gate with paired mottoes but the mottoes will no longer carry the old

21. SCMP 979, Feb. 2, 1955, p. 30.
22. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23. 1955, p. 2.

668 369 wishes for long life, happines, and wealth, but exhortations to conform to Communist standards.[23] The government may allow some additional foods for the season, but gambling is forbidden, and social life has been so thoroughly organized that it can be no longer restricted entirely to family and friends. The peasants have been urged to organize their own dramatic troupes to play the approved repertoire. Traveling troupes brought dramas to the villages, and 1500 film projecting teams moved into the countryside. The cadres organized "cultural lectures" for the rural groups. The old exchange of visits with relatives in nearby towns now has its Communist counterpart: interchange of visits between urban and rural workers' groups to observe one another's "progress in Communist reconstruction."[24]

668 369 788 The seasonal pilgrimage, in company, to some famous shrine also has its Communist counterpart: mass pilgrimages to Mao Tse-tung's native villages, which is being publicized as a national shrine.[25] Despite its frontal attack on the old familism, the Communist government last year provided special trains to take city dwellers back to their native villages for the holiday; a mass exodus was reported from Peking.[26]

668 527 Ch'ing-ming is no longer an approved festival, presumably because of its function as a celebration of kinship ties and family continuity. The next approved traditional holiday is the Dragon Boat festival in June. The boat races

23. Cf. collection of mottoes in Hua-nan t'ung-shu [South China Almanac] Canton, 1953, p. 32.
24. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23 1955, p. 2.
25. Ibid. 26. Ibid., Also, SCMP972, 1954 p. 21.

668 have been revivied, and the poet Ch'ü Yüan, nov
527 a "People's hero martyred in protest against a corrupt feudal regime," is the focus of celebrations.[27] The moon festival in autumn is also celebrated with extra food allowances and "cultural" activities. The various anniversaries of the Chinese Communist and of the World Communist movement probably do not break into the agricultural working year but they may be the occasion for special propaganda arranged by the local cadre. It will be seen that the pattern of living in the villages has been drastically altered; what remains of the old pattern is precisely what the government and the Party permits in the interests of morale or adapts in the interests of their rural program of change and indoctrination.

668 III. CHANGING PATTERNS OF LIVING
156

In the town and cities as in the countryside, the greatest changes in living patterns have been brought about by the network of new associations by which the regime envelops and controls the individual. Workers in various traditional crafts, merchants industrial workers, are all organized by the Party, and it is within these groups, under the guiadance of cadres, that the urban working population is most strenuously indoctrinated. In long and frequent meetings, the city dweller is under intense pressure to manifest "correct attitudes," to show himself free of all "feudal" and "bourgeois" taint, and to demonstrate his complete commitment to Communist goals.

---

27 SCMP, 1075, June 23, 1955, p. 25.

668 Through these and other channels he is under
156 continual pressure to step up his efficiency and productivity. The meetings take such a toll of his energy at the end of the working day that they are openly referred to as "fatigue meetings."[28]

City and town dwellers are also organized into street and ward units, and through these they are given further directives on the management of their lives.[29] The townsman more than the peasant, is open to an "around the clock" propaganda barrage From the first call to early morning calisthenics the radio blares in every street until late at night. There is pressure to join sports groups, study groups -- all with their ideological purposes. The major Communist holidays are celebrated in the cities with great parades and with endless speeches. Privacy, the chance to be at ease with family or friends, are both rare.

668 The New Year's holiday has some of its old
527 gaiety, although within the same restrictions imposed on the peasant. The cities receive special shipments of seasonal delicacies, as they appear to do at the mid-Autumn and Dragon Boat Festivals, and trips back to the family village may be possible for a minority of the urban population.[30] New Year's activities in East China

28. Rostow, op. cit. p. 160.
29. "Urban Organizations," Current Background 310, Jan. 17 1955. "Regulations of--"
30. [See following page.]

668 527 in 1955 suggest the way in which all public celebrations of the festival are made to serve the Communist purpose. It was reported that, along the East China coastal area, traditional merrymaking was combined "with strict vigilance and celebration of the Yikiangshan I-chiang-shan Island liberation." In Foochow, special exhibitions on the theme "Taiwan Must Be Liberated" drew large crowds. In the Amoy area and along the Chekiang coast, people called on units of the armed forces in their neighborhood "to bring them gifts and thank them for their efforts in national defense." In Shanghai, 40,000 spectators watched military teams play football and Red Army song and dance troupes performed at thirty factories.[31]

668 565 Cities have been cleaned up and enlarged, and building has apparently proceeded rapidly, although improvements in housing probably mainly affect the industrial workers the favored class

30. [continued] Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955 p. 2. In preparation for the New Year exodus from the cities in 1955 the Ministry of Railways estimated that "Over three and a half million more people will travel than on normal days mostly to join in united family celebrations of the holiday." NCNA dispatch, Jan. 19, 1955; SCMP, 972 Jan. 20, 1955, p. 21.

31. NCNA dispatch, Jan. 27, 1955. SCMP, 976, Jan. 28, 1955, p. 15 In all such activities one should remember that the cadre is instigator and manager.

668
565

in the drive for industrialization.[32] Yet the Rostow study indicates that there has been no real increase in wages for the urban worker.[33] His diet remains poor, his work hours long. But since the Party is anxious to recruit from urban workers, he does have opportunity to rise in life through Party work. Many industrial workers probably do feel some sense of identification with the most rapidly expanding sector of the Chinese economy. This identification and the opportunities offered by the Party are probably slowly changing the goals of the urban worker. He may be less interested than he once was in returning to a plot of land in the country, where economic opportunities are increasingly restricted. He knows, after attending one Party meeting, that the peasantry is no longer the favored class in the Chinese economy.

The elite of the towns and cities are the functionaries of the government and Party. We know little of the pattern of their private lives. But, if the badge of the old Chinese bureaucratic elite was a leisurely and cultivated air, the badge of the new is a full briefcase and an air of purposeful, energetic activity. Their incomes permit their families a life somewhat easier than that granted the rest of the urban population, but they are constantly under discipline, watched by their colleagues, obliged to meet work quotas and to submit to continuous indoctrination and re-indoctrination. Part and government workers are urged

---

32. Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.
33. Ibid., pp. 160-61.

1: Stanford U. S-4. 5 1956 AF 15 East China
AF 15

to use the New Year holiday to plan their work for the year to come.

The bulk of the old middle class may have survived, but its activities have been increasingly restricted by government controls and by the growth of government-producing and marketing facilities. They are a tough and tenacious group, but their old comfortable life is already threatened and, as a class, they are scheduled for extinction.[34]

The growing cities now appear to be replacing the country as the goal of the ambitious. It is likely that, as urbanization and industrialization proceed, the cities rather than the farm villages will determine as the Communists plan, the new mores and patterns of living for society as a whole.

---

34. Rostow, op. cit., pp. 162-64.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 15 East China
AF15

II. BASIC ATTITUDES

181 One of the principal reasons for the stability and long life of the old order in China was its special homogeneity. The imperial government fostered uniformity of attitudes and values, and Chinese statesmen belived this to be a more binding, durable, and cheaper cement for the imperial order than government coercion. Old China was primarily a way of life, a system of values and attitudes, and on this premise the state was organized. A foreigner who wished to become "naturalized" had only to show that he accepted Chinese attitudes and values; this he did by adopting Chinese dress and speech and patterns of behavior.

181 This characteristic of the old order is one 668 of the reasons why we find no important regional variations in basic attitudes. The other reason is that the Communist government is as determined in enforcing a uniformity of values and attitudes. and far more resourceful than was the imperial government of the past.

There are, however, certain local variations in temperament and ethos which effect, to a minor degree, the basic attitudes and values. ~~A few~~ of these will be noted. For the variant attitudes and values of ethnic and religious minorities, see the chapters on Ethnic Groups and Religion.

181 There have been profound changes in basic attitudes over the last century and particularly
• 668 during the last five years. Change has been
178 brought about by two factors. The first is the disintegration of the old social and political order resulting from its failure to adapt itself to the problems and pressures of the modern world. Consequently, people became criticial of the older attitudes and, in increasing numbers, adopted newer "modern" attitudes and values which were considered better suited to a modern China. The second is the power of the Communist state, which, in the last five years, has been used to inculcate a new and uniform set of values and attitudes.

181 These two factors are closely interrelated.
668 Thus, the Communists have been making a sympathetic use of individual and group-dissatisfaction with the old order to inspire and promote the acceptance of the new attitudes and values; the latter's appeal has been particularly strong with youth -- especially adolescents -- and with women who have been taught to regard the old social order as tyrannical and oppressive. The following will illustrate this point:

> Co-operative agriculture has
> organization,
> and women are not left out.
> In the old society we were badly
> mistreated,
> but the new society teaches
> friendship and love.[29]

29. Fu-nu San-tzu Ching [Three-character Classic for Women], Hsin-hua Publishing House, 1950, Op. 21. [cont'd next page]

181
668 In addition to capitalizing on discontent, the Communists have been making a peculiar use of traditional attitudes and values. Certain values from the old order still have a strong emotional appeal for the Chinese people. And the Communists seek to make the new order more acceptable by associating some of its elements with selected elements from the traditional culture. For example they insist that as a guiding principle of personal behavior the idea of "struggle" (tou-cheng) must replace that of "harmony"(ho).[30] People are taught to struggle for self-erfection and to engage in class struggle, in the struggle for a new China and in the struggle against deviation even when this involves attacking their friends. This is utterly contrary to the old ideal of harmony in personal relations, an ideal that means in practice a comfortable adjustment to one's natural and human environments. Yet in urging all to struggle, the Communists insist that the ultimate goal of all struggle is the Ta-t'ung-ching-yü -- the traditional utopian ideal of a harmonious, frictionless social order.[31]

[29. from previous page] Three-character rhymed verses were widely used in traditional China for the indoctrination of the young.

30. Cf. Arthur F. Wright, "Struggle vs. Harmony: Symbols of Competing Values in Modern China," World Politics, Vol. VI (Oct. 1953), pp. 31-44.

31. Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Dictatorship, 3rd ed., Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1950, pp. 16-17. For Mao, of course, the term means ultimate world-wide Communist utopia.

181
• 448 In discussing certain attitudes and values we should bear in mind that the power of the old and the appeal of the new vary not according to regions but according to social groups. It was among the population of modern cities like Shanghai that the old values were first challenged by the pressures of modern problems, but among the peasantry and rural gentry, despite many discontents and tensions, the old ways still prevailed.[32] Intellectuals and members of the new industrial and commercial groups were the first to discard traditional attitudes and dopt Western values; among other groups this process was slower. These variations affect Communist tactors to the extent that different kinds of persuasion are used with different groups. But the final goal is adoption of the attitudes and values decreed by the Communist leadership.

A. Good and Bad

183
577 In traditional China the prevailing belief was that man was inherently good and that social harmful behavior occurred only when men lacked guidance or were placed in adverse circumstances. For example, if the ruler of the state or his officials or the father of the family failed to provide for the basic physical needs of individuals, their dependents were likely to rebel. Or if those in authority failed to provide instruction, particularly if they failed to set an example in conduct, then those subordinate to them would have no guideposts to the good and would fall into evil ways.

---

35. For example, as later as 1941-43, one anthropologist found in rural Yunan that the traditional value of hsiao (filial submission) was
[cont'd next page]

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 15 East China
~~AF-15~~ AF15

779

Province	Lay Adherents	Modern Organizations
Shantung	5,730	5
Anhwei	105,300	22
Kiangsu	1,139,540	104
Chekiang	1,367,800	64
Fukien	96,870	21

779
668 Some Buddist schools and institutes as had survived have been taken over by the Communists. Buddhist periodicals have been stopped, publishing houses closed. Two Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines have been published, one in Peking, one in Shanghai; they are devoted to reconciling Buddhism and Marxism.[16] A new Chinese Buddhist Association was formed in Peking in November 1952, with several leading Buddhist scholars among its leaders.[17] Unlike the earlier Buddhist Association, which was organized by Buddhists to reform and defend their faith, the new body is sponsored, organized. and manipulated by the state and the Party. In China's relations with the Buddhist countries of Asia, it is used as a propaganda device to allay their fear that China is an enemy of Buddhism; it is also used to "soothe" and control Buddhist populations in Mongolia and Tibet.[18] Domestically

16. Atrocities. According to this report, circulation of Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines is very limited.

17. According to Buddhism in China, Peking, Nationalities Publishing House, 1955, p. 2, the effective date of organization was June 1953, when

[continued next page.]

779 668 the new association, like all others in Communist China, will be used primarily for the indoctrination and control of its members. As early as May 1951, a central committeeman of the Party outlined the chief tasks for Chinese Buddhists: (1) participation in land reform, (2) opposition to counterrevolutionaries, (3) participation in the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, and (4) recognition of the duty to construct a new religion in the new society.[19]

In the principal cities, especially those visited by delegations from Buddhist countries like Burma and Ceylon, a few temples are maintained for religious use. But the greatest number of temples have been converted for use by the state. One source, admittedly strongly biased, asserts that the number of Peking temples in religious use has fallen from 1,300 to 3, that in Nanking the number has decreased from 400 to 1, in Shanghai from 600 to 2, and in Hangchow from 300 to 1.[20] Certain Buddhist monuments of

---

17. [continued] 93 persons representing "the monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen of different nationalities and Buddhist schools of various regions" were elected to serve as its board of directors.

18. The Dalai Lama, the Panchen Ngoerhtehni, the Chagan Kogen of Inner Mongolia, and the Venerable Hsü Yün have been chosen as honorary presidents of Buddhist Association. Cf., Buddhism in China, p. 20.

19. Richard Walker, China Under Communism, New Haven, 1955, pp. 188-89.

20. Atrocities.

779 historical and cultural importance are being re-
668 stored and preserved.[21]

As we have pointed out, the clergy has been largely secularized. In Shanghai, as in other cities, monks have opened restaurants specializing in Buddhist dishes. Everywhere the clergy has converted temples into small factories in order to produce hand-made articles. Monks of the Fa-tsang temple in Shanghai now work on nearby farms. In Hangchow, some 1,800 monks and nuns have opened restaurants or are working in mills and on farms; they have established an association in order to co-ordinate their enterprises.[22]

There are occasional reports of Buddhist ceremonies, such as the celebration of the Buddha's birthday.[23] But the general impression is that Buddhism is dying out. The old may cling to their beliefs, but their influence on their children is now slight. Buddhist belief is a handicap to youth who must adopt Marxist orthodoxy in order to "succeed" under the present regime.

---

21. Buddhism in China, introduction and plates.

22. Chan, op. cit., pp. 90-91. Based on testimony of refugees, 1950.

23. New China News Agency, Peking, May 29, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press, 1058, p. 48; also photograph of the ceremony of "Bathing the Buddha" on May 20, 1953, in Buddhism in China.

779 668 The cadres in the countryside are attacking "superstition," and their ridicule of old Buddhist-linked observances is further undermining the faith. The clergy, never up to their task of serving a modern religious community, has turned to other pursuits. There is little in Buddhist doctrine to steel the believer to resist totalitarianism or the trend of the times. The willingness of some Buddhist leaders to openly embrace Communist doctrine has probably undermined what little will to resist there may have been.[24]

III. TAOISM

779 Some of the tendencies noted in the modern history of Chinese Buddhism are also to be found in Taoism. But the differences are many, and they spring from fundamental differences between the two religions.

It is convenient for our purposes to consider two levels of Taoism. One is Taoism as an organized religion; the other is Taoism as a folk religion at the village level.[25] The Taoist religion developed as a reaction to the challenge of the imported faith of Buddhism. It borrowed extensively from its alien rival; its scriptures, its clerical hierarchy and organization, its rituals, its heavens

---

24. Outstanding example is Chü-tsan -- a modern-minded reformist monk with an excellent background in philosophy, religous and social work, the latter particularly in Hunan. He was one of two Buddhist delegates (out of 585) to the People's Political Consultative Conference. Chan, op. cit., p. 92, records Chü-tsan's willingness as of 1948 to support a Communist regime. Cf., Chü-tsan's article, "A Buddhist Monk's Life," in China Reconstructs, Jan.-Feb. 1954, pp. 42-44.

779 Chinese Mohammedans in the course of the modernist movement, accepted the Chinese translation of the Koran, hitherto only in the sacred language of Arabic, and opened schools which taught general as well as religious subjects. And they began, like modernists of other faiths, to emphasize the compatability between the Koran and modern science.[49] They published modern periodicals, of which there were nine in 1947; circulation, however, was small. In 1936 the first Chinese Moslem to be so honored received a degree from El Ashar University, the great center of Islamic learning in Cairo. By 1950 the Chinese Islamic Association had set up or co-ordinated two-hundred primary schools and twenty high schools; the Islamic Theological College at the Chungking mosque was opened in 1945. All of these institutions, however, were handicapped by the poverty of the Chinese Moslem community and by suspicion of Chinese learning born of religious conservatism.[50]

779 668 What have been Chinese Communist policies toward the problem of Chinese Islam, a problem that involves some areas where they are a major segment of the population and other areas -- such as the East China Region -- where they represent a cohesive, slowly modernizing religious community? (The policies adopted toward major centers of Moslem population, are dealt with in the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Communist religious

49. Chan, op. cit., p. 198.
50. Chan, op. cit., pp. 198-205.

779 668 policies toward Mohammedanism have something in common with Communist policies toward other religions. The standard pattern of organization has been established by the Peking government: An All-China Islamic Association which, it should be emphasized, differs from former organizations in being an instrument of control over Chinese Mohammedans operated by a hierarchy ideologically acceptable to the Communists. A Peking propaganda booklet issued in 1955 states that, "The work of education is really tackled seriously now, and the number of primary and secondary school pupils is now double the figure before liberation."[51] This may sound like "progress," but what it undoubtedly means is that the children of Chinese Moslems are increasingly being given the prescribed Communist education.

The cadre is the basic instrument for the Communization of Chinese Islam. Offering the education and prestige inducements of Party work has apparently successfully recruited cadres from among young Chinese Moslems. "In the government organs there have been many Moslem cadres. Some of them have taken up the leadership jobs. In the areas where the Moslems have

---

51. Chinese Moslems. A NCNA dispatch dated June 9, 1955, states that Moslem students in Shanghai have increased from 290 in 1949 to 3,000. Government subsidies (and control) might account for this. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

779 668 been comparatively concentrated, the government has paid attention to foster the basic-level Moslem cadres."[52]

The policy of Communization is well reflected in a speech by Ma Sung-t'ing, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Moslem Cultural Association, on the occasion of the "Second Enlarged Conference" in June 1955. This conference, he said,

> "...will study how to help the government to carry out the ideological education in patriotism, national unity, and Socialist transformation among the Moslems, so as to further strengthen and consolidate national unity and continue to develop and raise the Moslem political, economic and cultural levels in jointly carrying out the construction of the fatherland."[53]

The Chinese Communists' policy towards the Moslems has been affected by two factors which do not influence their policies towards other religions: (1) the Russian pattern of handling integrated minority groups through various types of "culturally autonomous" organizations; (2) Chinese ambitions in Islamic areas of Asia which foster tactical tolerance towards the Islamic minority in China. Thus the glamorized picture-publication Chinese Moslems has texts in English, Chinese, Arabic, and Indonesian, and its introduction ends with the greeting "Salaam to all

52. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

53. NCNA dispatch, SCMP, 1067, June 11-13, 1955, p. 24.

54. Chinese Moslems, introduction. [See next page.]

779 668 peace-loving Moslems."[54] Selections from the works of Mao Tse-tung have been translated into Arabic for the indoctrination of the Ahungs who do not know Chinese; probably these translations will be used in Indonesia and other countries where Arabic is a lingua-franca. Mosques in "show" cities such as Canton, Shanghai, and Peking have been renovated and serve to demonstrate to Moslem visitors the "reality" of Communist China's promise of religious freedom.

We have little reliable information on the Islamic communities of East China today. But some trends should be noted. The education of Islamic youth, although special Moslem schools have been set up by the government, will be in the pattern ordained by the government, and the youth will tend in time to become more Communist than Moslem.[55] Secondly, the break-up of the closely knit communities in East China will probably proceed apace. The Communist government boasts of the increasing number of Moslem youth now classified as "workers";[56] this means integration of the youth into new state-ordained patterns of activity in factories and workers organizations; it means that they will slowly be alienated from their parents' values as well as from their parents' occupational roles. Thirdly, as Moslems increasingly share in government and social activities, there will be less inclination on their part towards a defensive

55. A NCNA dispatch of June 9, 1955 states that there are five primary and one middle school for Moslems in Shanghai and that 90 per cent of the students are not charged full tuition.

56. NCNA, Peking, June 10, 1955; SCMP 1067, p. 23.

779 668 separatism; it is claimed, for example, that 72 Moslems have been deputies to Shanghai municipal and ch'ü congresses, and token participation tends to bring them into new orbits of activity.[57] Among the 29,000 Moslems in Shanghai, measures have allegedly been taken to provide for their special religious dietary needs,[58] and there are references to special food shipments for Ramadan. Such measures would tend to reduce [illegible] suspicion and resistance among the Moslems and, in the long run, to make integration easier. The Moslems of East China do not have the relative safety in numbers possessed by the large regional communities in the Southwest and the Northwest. The processes of Communization, secularization, and integration will probably advance rapidly in East China. The measures we have noted plus the activity of the Moslem cadre backed by the full force and apparatus of Communist government, will do more to reduce the age-old separatism and resistance of Islam than the measures of earlier Chinese governments.

V. CATHOLICISM

797 The older of the two Christian faiths in China has had 350 years of missionary and organizational experience. It is, in China as elsewhere, resourceful, flexible, and highly disciplined. In modern China, Catholicism has repeatedly come under nationalistic attack because

57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.

confiscation of church property, church schools, and hospitals were accompanied by a steady expulsion of the missionaries. The following figures show the decrease in Protestant missionary personnel between 1935 and 1949 and the almost total elimination of missionaries since that time.[83] In 1935, there were 5,816 Protestant missionaries in China; in 1949, about 3,000; in April 1952, only 100.

It is not possible to document the proportion of Chinese Protestants who have made their peace with the Communist regime, but "modernism," the social gospel, sectarianism, and the lack of such punitive sanctions as excommunication all tend to make the Protestants less resistant to Communist force and persuasion than the Catholics. The "three autonomies" -- in support, government and propagation -- has been a stated goal of Chinese Protestantism since 1851, and the Chinese Protestant community has generally accepted this, when stated by the Communists, as a praiseworthy end.[84] A leading Chinese Protestant layman -- under what degree of pressure we do not know -- found a number of ways to come to terms with Communism: (1) as far back as the founding of Judaism, men's highest hope has been the establishment of a solidly united, ideal society; the Communists promise such a society; (2) sectarianism has created dissension, but the Chinese have a genius for compromise; therefore there is an opportunity to promote (under the Communist government) "a grand union of the churches"; (3) Christianity is a religion of world revolution, but it has been fettered and frustrated by feudal

83. The first figure is from Handbook of the Christian Movement, reproduced in Pamboriena, p. 82. Other figures are from Walker. op. cit. p. 19.

84. Lacy, op. cit., pp. 307-08.

797 and reactionary institutions. The age of Marxism
668 Leninism, therefore, is favorable to the realization of "Christian ideals."[85] Chinese Protestants are barraged by such statements, which even go so far as to assert that Jesus was a "patriotic anti-imperialist" in defending his country against the Romans.[86] How successfully Chinese Protestants are resisting this type of persuasion and the manifold pressures and blandishments of the Communist regime is unknown. Again, as in the case of the Catholics, loss of Protestant youth to the Communist "religion" would mean that the future in China will be dark indeed.

797 The East China Region has had the following distribution of Protestants. The first column gives the percentage of total population which was Protestant in 1938, the second, the gross number of Protestants in 1924.[87]

Province	1938 (per cent)	1924 (gross)
Shantung	12.2	41,821
Anhwei	1.5	5,070
Kiangsu	8.3	29,783
Chekiang	7.3	27,902
Fukien	11.3	38,584

85. Ts'ai Yung-ch'un, "Progressive Road for Christianity in the New China," Hsin Kuan-ch'a [New Observation], Vol. I, No. 8, Oct. 10, 1950; Current Background, 40, Dec. 15, 1950, p. 3.

86. Hsü, op. cit., p. 41.

87. Ku T'ing-ch'ang's percentage figures published in the Collectanea Commissionis Synodalis, XI, 1938, pp. 272, 281. Tables reproduced in Damboriena, pp. 90-91. These percentages are

1;Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~#313~~ AF15

II. AFFILIATED PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

A. New Democratic Youth Corps (NDYC)

668 883 1. The Party and the Corps. The relationship of the Party to the New Democratic Youth Corps is such that the latter is controlled by the Party, as provided by the Constitution of the corps.[23] Party members are in charge of corps agencies above the county levels, thus placing the direction of all corps activities in the hands of the Party. The first function of the NDYC is to provide a reservoir of potential Party members. Its second task is to supply needed activists in all organizations. The corps membership in Shanghai in 1949, for example, stood at 37,889 and was distributed in all key organizations.[24] Of this number, 18,348 were workers, 14,599 were students, and 4,942 were teachers and office workers. The final task of the NDYC is to engage in the broadest possible range of activities in order to reach sections of society where formal Party organization is lacking.

665 883 2. Organization. The organization of the NDYC in the East China Region is patterned after the Party. While national agencies

23. The Constitution of the New Democratic Youth Corps, ibid., July 7, 1953, p. 3.

24. Liberation Daily, January 1, 1950, p. 10.

1;Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

668 883 B. The Young Pioneers

The relationship between the corps and the Young Pioneers is governed by the provisions in Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the NDYC. In the East China Region, efforts to organize youth between the ages of 9 and 15 into the Yount Pioneers were made in January 1950, a decision made by the Central Committee of the corps in October 1949. By April 1952, membership in the Young Pioneers in East China[26] was estimated at 1,200,000. Members were concentrated in the city of Shanghai, and their programs were patriotic. Since 1953, emphasis has shifted to recruitment of more members. National membership as of March 1955 was estimated at 70 million, or about 15 per cent of the youth in the 9-15 age group.[27]

SECTION TWO

POLITICAL DYNAMICS: POLITICAL CONTROL

665

Communist power in the East China Region is supported by three pillars -- the Party, the bureaucracy, and instruments of control, i.e., the military, public security agencies, and other

26. Liberation Daily, May 4, 1952, p. 3.
27. Kuang-ming Jih-pao [The Enlightenment Daily], March 14, 1955, p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

665 room are means of encouraging accusations and complaints against government employees. All government agencies are required to have these facilities. During 1954, the Kiangsu provincial government was reported to have received an estimated 100,000 letters of complaint.[38]

II. PARTY CONTROL OVER MASS ORGANIZATIONS

668 Communist policies toward mass organizations have been well calculated and effectively carried out. From the Party point of view, mass organizations are political assets: they serve as links between the Party and the masses and they are the means by which the Party succeeds in organizing all sections of society. Each of these mass organizations represents a specific segment of the populace and is itself a social and economic force.

After the Communist seizure of power in East China, mass organizations were immediately organized. Not until 1952, however, were they placed upon a permanent basis. Mass organizations are represented in this region by branches in key cities and appropriate places, depending upon their type of service. The most influential are discussed here to illustrate the pattern of Party control.

38. Ibid., February 5, 1955, p. 3.

1;Stanford U, S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

A. Trade Unions

668
467 Trade unions are regarded as the link between the Party and the workers. Since trade unions form the backbone of industrial development, and since East China is one of the most industrialized regions of China, the control of trade unions by the Party is one of the foremost tasks of the Party organizations in East China.

In the East China Region, an East China Trade Union Working Committee was established as the representative body of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.[39] The chairman of this committee was also in charge of the Shanghai Federation of Municipal Trade Unions, which is no doubt the largest organization in this region. Under the regional committee, local trade union councils reach from the provinces to the towns, an administrative unit equivalent to hsiang; namely, "urban centers" in rural communities.

To destroy the existing labor organizations, the Party associated their elimination with the suppression of counterrevolutionaries and the Democratic Reform Movement. Ever since the Communists seized power in this region,

39. Text of the Constitution of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ibid., May 14, 1953, p. 2; English text will be found in Current Background, No. 248, June 22, 1953.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

668
467 they have taken drastic measures to suppress counterrevolutionaries. In larger factories, former labor leaders were singled out for liquidation. They were either accused of being spies in the past or leaders of secret societies. The Democratic Reform Movement directly aimed at the liquidation of old union leadership, was launched at a later date in East China than in other regions. Not as vigorous as in other region it concentrated upon the consolidation of gains after the destruction of the old leadership. The Democratic Reform Movement against privately-owned enterprises in Shanghai did not begin until December 1952.[40]

A trade union organization similar to that of the Party branch is organized by the trade union members working in the same enterprise. As a general rule, a committee is formed whenever the membership reaches twenty-five. The trade union committee sets up a workshop (department) committee to direct the work of its departments. Workshop committees are sometimes divided into trade union teams according to production units and work units. The reason for the closely patterned organization and structure of the trade union is to enhance Party control and, in turn, to convert trade unions into effective and militant organizations.

---

40. Report of the Municipal Council of Trade Unions, Liberation Daily, October 1, 1952, p. 1, ibid., December 11, 1952, p. 2.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

668
467 The methods employed by the Party for political control over other organizations are applicable here, of course. The subjection of trade union affairs to the direction of the Party Commission on trade unions and the placing of Party personnel in key positions in the trade unions are customary practices at all levels.

However, the most effective method of control is the Party directive that Party orders are to be carried out within but not outside of the trade unions.[41] Control involves three steps. First, the Party branch is the starting point for the formulation of directives, working plans, and cadre policies. Secondly, the Party branch suggests to the presidium of the Trade Union Council those policies in need of discussion. Party members elected to the presidium must direct the trade unions meeting and successfully pilot the Party proposal through the presidium. Thirdly, after the resolution is adopted, Party and NDYC corps members must accept it unconditionally and serve as activists to make sure that the resolution is carried out.

C. Federation of Democratic Women (FDW)

668 The most active federation in the East

41. People's Daily, May 7, 1953, p. 2.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

China Region was the Shanghai Municipal Federation of Democratic Women,[42] which was organized from the five major women's organizations existing before the Communist seizure of power in 1949. When the federation was formally organized in August 1950, it took in women workers in the trade unions and women students. The membership of the East China Women's Federation[43] stood at 30,000,000 in March 1951. The importance of the federation cannot be judged by its numerical supremacy alone. The position of women in Communist society is such that they constitute an important part of the labor force and their influence is being extended to the entire populace. The federation is a political force and is organized to reach all levels of society.

At the village level, the federation forms the most active part of the rural movement. Particularly, their participation in the Peasnat's Association should be mentioned. During the land reform period, the Women's Federation in South Anhwei mobilized 180,000 women to participate in the Peasant's Association, constituting one third of the total membership.[44]

---

42. Liberation Daily, October 22, 1949, p. 7.
43. Ibid., March 8, 1951, p. 1.
44. Ibid., February 17, 1950, p. 3.

• 668 Such a political role has evolved for the Women's Federation as a result of participation in all farm drives and the full support given the hsiang government and Party apparatus.

In the cities, women also play an important part. Women's Federation teams are organized in the streets and alleys. They engage in urban inhabitants' committee work and in carrying out propaganda among the female populace. In addition to their active participation in all movements in the cities, the federation also co-operates with the Department of Women Workers of the trade unions.

Party control over the Women's Federation follows the same pattern as that over other mass organizations. The Party as well as the New Democratic Youth Corps maintains a commission on women's affairs, which is authorized to formulate policy. Furthermore, Party directives are carried out through Party branches organized within the federation.

D. Other Mass Organizations

A number of mass organizations having a strong influence on society are represented in the East China Region. The Shanghai Student Federation, a member organization of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, was very active. The All-China Federation of

1;Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

668 Literature and Art Cirlces also had a branch in Shanghai in July 1950. The most enthusiastically supported organization is the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, which was established in Shanghai in October 1949. Its East China office was formally organized in November 1951. In April 1951, the association claimed a membership[45] of 943,269 people in the East China Region. These mass organizations have their branches in most of the major cities and counties throughout the region. Party control over these mass organizations follows with little variation the same pattern.

III. PARTY CONTROL IN THE RURAL AREAS

Political power in the rural area is the foundation of Communist power in the East China Region. Here lies the strength and the weakness of the region and of the Party; here the pattern of political dynamics is most revealing and Communist power encounters the greatest opposition. For this reason, a thorough discussion of the subject is necessary.

The establishment of Communist power at this level can be divided into three periods (1) The initial construction period -- prior to the completion of land reform, when political power was centered in the peasants' associations and geared to land reform in the rural areas. (2) The consolidation period -- a period of

45. Hopei Jih-pao [Hopei Daily], Paoting, April 15, 1951, p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF13~~ AF15

168 repercussion and a trial period for the producers' cooperative movement, marked by the gradual shift of political power from the Peasants' Association to the hsiang government, controlled by the Party. (3) The election and the post-Constitution period. The continuous suppression of opposition during the election fo 1953-54, however, laid the foundation for Communist political power. The post-Constitution period displayed a renewed consolidation of political power in the government and Party.

A. The Initial Construction (1949 to 1952)

The political meaning of the Land Reform Movement has been reiterated by the Communist leaders.[46] They regard it as a political struggle; its very essence lies in the abolition of the land-ownership system and the destruction of old political forces in the rural districts.

Throughout land reform, a number of different measures were taken to accomplish this task. Each of the stages of land reform -- preparation, execution, and re-examination -- displayed its political aim and rendered service to the Party.

46. Liu Shao-ch's report on the land reform, Enlightenment Daily, June 30, 1950, p. 1.

• 68 During land reform, power centers in the rural area remained with: (1) the Party, (2) the Peasant's Association, (3) the hsiang government, and (4) the militia. Of these, the Peasant's Association and the militia, organized as instruments of terror, were of particular importance.

The organization of peasant associations in the East China Region was determined by the manner in which rural power was established in this region.[47] The fact that many localities in the provinces of Shantung, Anhwei, and Kiangsu were old Communist bases facilitated the execution of land reform in newly-acquired areas. Party veterans from established Communist sources were joined by a large number of cadre selected from the Army. In many areas where the use of force was necessary, soldiers constituted the backbone of land reform work-teams. In the province of Chekiang, for instance, over 10,000 Army cadres were employed.[48] to assist in the organization of poor peasants, the organization of Peasant's Associations, and to help reinforce the local militia. The direct use of force was responsibl

47. In most places in East China, land reform was launched at the end of 1950 as in the other regions, and was 87 per cent complege in September 1951. In Fukien Province, land reform was completed in the spring of 1952; Liberation Daily, November 29, 1951; Fukien Daily, June 28, 1952, p. 1.

48. Liberation Daily, October 8, 1949, p. 4; ibid., May 18, 1950, p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

668 for the rapid conclusion of the land reform and the establishment of Communist political power in the rural areas in this region. By November 1949, an estimated 800,000 peasants had joined the Peasants' Association in eighteen counties in the special district of South Kiangsu.[49] Even in the province of Fukien, the last province to be seized by the Communists, an estimated membership of nine million was reported.[50]

668 701 The militia is an instrument of terror at the disposal of the Party. An organization of poor peasants and farm laborers (67 per cent) and of youth (aged 18-30), it is strongly class conscious.

At the end of the land reform in November 1951, the strength of the militia in the East China Region[51] was reported at 2,900,000. In addition to the normal duties assigned to the militia in this region, such as guarding granaries, bridges and transportation centers, the militia was also responsible for coastal defense. Militia units in the provinces of Fukien, Chekiang, and Kiangsu were noted for their role in coastal operations. In a twenty-month period

49. Ibid., November 12, 1949, p. 5.
50. Ibid., July 14, 1950, p. 3.
51. Liu Jui-lung's report on the conclusion of land reform in the East China Region, Ibid., November 29, 1951, p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

668 to April 1951, the Fukien militia fought 5,829 701 "battles" in co-operation with the Communist regular troops, and engaged in 4,514 "battles" on its own.[52] This included many "engagements" in defense of the China coast.

B. Consolidation Period (1952-1953)

668 As the Land Reform Movement came to a close, Communist power was established in the region in spite of serious defects reported. The infiltration of "reactionary" elements into the Party organization and the increase of the "new-rich" among Party members, for example, necessitated the expulsion of an estimated 10 per cent of the Party members in the province of Shantung. The general apathy of Party cadre, as a result of low level of education and the unlimited demand imposed upon the Party members, caused some incidents suggesting political instability. Of particular concern was the Wu-to ("five-too-many") phenomenon.[53] Party members found themselves assigned too many jobs -- an average of four jobs per person. And Party members had to attend

52. Ibid., April 28, 1951, p. 5.

53. The five-too-many included: too many tasks, too many meetings, too many forms, too many organizations, and too many concurrent jobs.

668 too many meetings. Too many jobs and too many meetings resulted in inefficiency and demoralization. It was necessary for the Communists to begin Party rectification and work for the consolidation of the power centers in the rural districts.

Directives issued by the East China Military and Political Committee at the end of the Land Reform Movement prescribed the key tasks for rural work.[54] The theme was the increase of agricultural production through the organization of mutual teams and agricultural producers' co-operatives. This task was assigned to the Party and hsiang government and consequently made possible the transfer of political power from the Peasant's Association to Party and government agencies. This transfer was evidenced in the overhauling of Party units and mass organizations operating in the rural district, the convening of ch'ü and hsiang People's representative conferences and the strengthening of the hsiang government. The overhauling of Party units and mass organization was necessary because on these bases depended the transfer of power from the Peasant's Association to the Party and hsiang government.

668
632 The convening of ch'ü and hsiang government People's representative conferences had

54. Liberation Daily, July 9, 1952, p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

668 been an important task, because the control of
632 the conference by the Party ensured the election of hsiang governments. Such as task was at first limited to a few localities. The experience gained was helpful in other areas. However, in Shantung, the progress was better, due largely to the early conclusion of land reform.

The convening of hsiang People's representative conferences involved the holding of peasant representative conferences and the election of hsiang governments. As of July 1951, some 37 per cent (4,865) of the hsiang governments in Shantung Province had undergone the process of consolidation.[55] At the Second East China Civil Affairs Conference[56] in July 1952, some 2,147 representative conferences were held and 17,128 hsiang governments had been established (34.2 per cent of the total). The newly established hsiang governments were reorganized to include the several commissions on co-operatives, public security, finance and food, culture and education, militia, mediation, relief and irrigation, and forestry.

Equally important to the reorganization

55. Ibid., July 25, 1951, p. 6.
56. Ibid., July 9, 1952, p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

668 of hsiang governments is the strengthening of
632 rural leadership. The principle of collective leadership was the central theme. It called for redesignation of the Committee jobs, the introduction of new administrative procedures, and the strengthening of Party leadership over other mass organizations. The old practice of concentration of power in one individual and the delegation of power to a few were declared outmoded methods.

C. The Election and the Post-Constitution Period

666 The Communists' announcement of nation-wide elections in 1953 indicated the degree of confidence in their power at the basic administrative levels. However, the elections held in 1953 and 1954 served again as an instrument to liquidate opposition.

668 In the East China Region, the attempt to
631 abolish the village as an administrative unit and to reallocate hsiang administrations has been designated as one of the tasks involved in the establishment of Communist power in the rural area prior to the elections.[57] However, before 1953 such tasks were restricted to a few places and served to gain experience before

57. Directive of rural political works, ibid., July 9, 1952, p. 1.

668 these tasks were introduced in a wide area.
631 The reallocation of ch'ü and hsiang administrative units increased the number of units and facilitated control. In some places a hsiang was redivided into two parts. A directive[58] issued in May 1953 by the Shantung Party Sub-Bureau on the reconstruction of key counties was a renewed effort of the Party to enforce the reallocation and to prepare for the nationwide election in 1954.

After the promulgation of the Communist Constitution, political power was further strengthened. The hsiang People's Congress now holds highest authority but true power remains with the hsiang People's Council. Since these two institutions have gone through the two stages of construction and consolidation, Communist power is securely entrenched in the rural areas. On the other hand, with rising peasant resistance and maladministration of Communist policies in the rural areas, the Communist have encountered many obstruction. As a result, two drastic measures were taken by the regime in 1955. One measure was to overhaul the agricultural producers' co-operatives,[59]

---

58. People's Daily, May 9, 1953, p. 1.

59. "Wei-shen-ma Pi-hsü Chung-shih Nung-yeh Sheng-ch'an Ho-tso-she Ti Kung-ku Kung-tso?" ["Why Should the Work of Solidification of the Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives be Stressed?"], New China Monthly, March 1955, pp. 133-34.

1:Stanford U, S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

668 and the other was the announcement of the first
631 Rural Basic Level Organization Conference[60] in April 1955. The basic task of the conference was the strengthening of Party leadership in agricultural producers' co-operative organizations and the gradual collectivization of farm production.

IV. PARTY CONTROL IN THE CITIES

668 Following the course that had proved successful in the rural districts, the Communists in the cities established and consolidated their control. The Democratic Reform Movement and the Suppression-of-counter-revolutionaries Movement directed at the trade unions and at the urban population, and the violent and widespread Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, directed at the Party, administration, industrial, and business circles of society in effect performed functions similar to those of the land reform in the rural areas.

However, Communist control in the city is retained through the maintenance of a set of control organizations, extending from workers' trade unions to the students' federation and reaching into every street. Following is a brief discussion of the different organizations.[61]

60. People's Daily, March 9, 1955, p. 1.
61. Ibid., January 1, 1955, p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

668 633 The Urban Inhabitants' Committee is organized with the stated aim of contributing to the welfare of the residents. The basic unit is a family residing in or sharing a house with others, and a committee administers the affairs of from 100-600 families. An attempt was made to organize urban inhabitants in the 6,008 alleys in Shanghai in the winter of 1950. The committee organization was not widely established until 1951. As of June 1954, some 1,852 committees and 36,000 teams had been organized.

The Urban Street Office is the representative of the city government and acts as a liaison between the government and the street. In fact, the office serves to check and impose rules upon the residents. Its jurisdiction paralleis that established for the Public Security Sub-Station, thus enforcing a doublecheck among the residents. The Public Security Sub-Station is responsible, in the main, for the maintenance of public order and the suppression of counter-revolutionary activity.

668 The Mediation Committee is a "mass" organization, established both in the city and in the village. Its function is to mediate disputes, propagandize government statutes, and exercise "judicial" power in the village and street for misdemeanors uncovered by the Peoples' tribunals. Although the committee acts as a third party in a dispute, it must not be overlooked that the committee represents

668 the government view and that it employs self-criticism as one of its primary techniques.

It seems that the Communist control in the cities is much more rigid and forceful than in the villages. With the spread of Communist domination in many mass organizations, factories and other professional organizations, Communist control in the city is further strengthened. No doubt the public security sub-stations play a leading role in the enforcement of government rules. However, the importance of other organizations, notably the procuratorates and the Peoples' co:rts, should not be minimized.

SECTION THREE

ELECTION AND POLITICS OF MINOR PARTIES

I. ELECTIONS

666

The nationwide election which produced the People's congress at all levels was held in the East China Region between 1953 and July-August 1954. A Communist election is a process whereby organized propaganda is concentrated for purposes of political indoctrination. People are not allowed to choose between policies and candidates. The fact that there is only one political platform removes this

665 In the third place, with the consolidation of Communist political power at all levels, the position of minor parties is further endangered. For instance, the liquidation of private capitalists in the transitional stage would certainly reduce, in the end, the political position of the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy. Eventually minor parties will no longer exist as political forces in the ordinary sense because their political influence will be insignificant.

A. Control and Infiltration

665 668 The most effective way of eliminating minor parties and their activities is to exercise strict control over them either through direct subjugation or infiltration. A glance at the guiding principles to be observed by all minor parties participating in the Chinese People's P.C.C. would indicate the degree to which these minor parties have subordinated themselves to the will of the Chinese Communist Party. In addition to acknowleding the position of the Communist Party as the core of the state's power, minor parties "must assist the state organs and set the social forces in motion... maintain close contact with the masses... continue to consolidate and develop the alliance between China and the USSR...study Marxist-Leninist theories on a voluntary basis, study state policy, elevate political levels, practice criticism and self-criticism, and strive for ideological remolding." (General principles of

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~
AF15

665 the Constitution of the Chinese People's
668 Political Consultative Conference.)

The infiltration of the Communist Party into the minor parties to compel their final extinction is perhaps the regime's far-reaching design. In the East China Region this will be done by the control of membership policies of the minor parties by the Communist Party and by the training of members of the minor parties in charge of organizations. A training class[70] was held in November 1951. Their curriculum included Chinese Communist history and organizational policy; their instructors were Communist Party members. Certain conditions were established under which the expansion of minor parties was to take place. These parties must be free from "reactionary elements." To date, 55 persons have been expelled from the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, 76 per cent of this number for political reasons. Expansion has been restricted to big cities, and is not permitted in minority groups. Furthermore, activists were encouraged to enroll during the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Campaign.

---

70. Liberation Daily, November 22, 195[illegible], p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2f,
Political Background

SUBVERSIVE POTENTIALITIES

668
578 In view of the present importance of the East China Region to the nation's economy and to the Communist military preparation for offensive action against the Nationalists on Formosa, the Communists have assiduously pursued in this region a series of measures aimed at the suppression of opposition to their regime. Open and "subversive" opposition has its origin in at least three sources: (1) "Counter-revolutionaries" -- armed bandits, landlords, former Nationalist officials, members of the Nationalist armed forces, Kuomintang and foreign agents, and the secret societies -- are regarded by the Communists as "basically hostile elements." (2) Harmful activities which the Communists consider dangerous to the stability of their regime are specified for elimination. This includes corruption, waste, and theft in Party and government organizations, in industrial establishments, and in rural co-operatives. (3) Tension and public discontent among Party members and government employees and among the populace are common in an excessively controlled and centralized state. These conditions, if not checked, may contribute to the demoralization and the eventual disruption of the Communist regime.

578 discontent and tension have not been eradicated.
668
656 A. Public Discontent

1. Regimentation and Restriction.

517 The Communist attempt to organise the people
656 and regiment their activities meets the
668 greatest resistance. The forced establishment of agricultural producers' co-operatives in the rural districts and the organization of all urban workers into unions are Communist efforts of note.

The imposition upon the peasants of spare-time activities and duties is perhaps the most objectionable feature. The peasant is required to attend meetings, to attend winter schools, to be advised on all farm activities, and to perform various duties according to his age and sex. Even how he is to spend his money is decided by Party counseling. Such advice is, in fact, a series of propaganda bombardments, which may include interviews, meetings, and classes. This process is both time-consuming and vastly irritating.

Similar restrictions are imposed upon the workers in the city. During working hours, workers are required to observe labor discipline. They are severly punished if they are late to work or leave early. Loafing and belligerence are crimes subject to punishment. During their "leisure time,"

517 workers are required to participate in
656 organizational and cultural activities and to
668 attend technical and cultural classes. Since most workers hold membership in a number of Communist organizations, no time is left for private affairs.

668 2. High Taxation and Public Obligation.
656 High taxation and business restrictions are
[651] other unpopular Communist policies. In the rural districts, the Communist San Ting policy, formulated at the end of 1953, fixes a quota for farm production and for purchasing and marketing. Other measures which regulate the sale of farm surplus products -- mainly rice and cotton -- only to the centralized market, meet resistance. Businessmen are required to pay high taxes, pubchase bonds, and make "voluntary contributions." Other measures taken by the Communists to eliminate private business doubtlessly create great dissatisfaction among the people.

Public obligations imposed upon the people are also a cause for discontent. The peasant, for example, is called upon whenever his services are needed. For major irrigation projects, peasants are enlisted for work in distant areas. The service of the militia is necessary on many occasions, and so the young peasant is required to accept military training in his spare time. When he becomes a member of the militia, he must patrol the

656 key centers in the village area, guard and help
668 to ship government grain, assist in the extermination of "bandits," and attend militia "cultural" and organizational activities. A parallel scheme is instituted in the city. Urban residents are generally expected to render certain services in the areas where they live. In addition to attending regular meetings, they are expected to serve as patrols whenever patrols become necessary.

668 Controls imposed by security agencies
208 and other organizations, including large-scale rationing programs and constant investigations, contribute to public discontent. However, the Communists recognize the limits of public inconvenience and growing dissatisfaction. They stress the employment of a mass-line policy, which, to some extent, will absorb mass complaints, and they mobilize their propaganda machine for better effect.

B. Tension within Organizations

668 Although the various control agencies
578 employed by the Party to supervise and to ensure the execution of Party directives within a government organization help to maintain Party supremacy, their functions and responsibilities often overlap, resulting in confusion

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

•668 and tension among the employees.[58]
578

Because these control agencies have the same jurisdiction in all organizations, any one department or factory may have four different controls at the same time -- the control committee of the Party, the supervisory offices of the administration, the people's procuratorates, and the public security agencies. Under this multi-control system, each agency of control exerts pressure upon all members of the organization and extends to every part of the organization.

Over-centralization results in tension. In the sphere of politics, for example, transmission of directives from the central government, allocation of work, and the choice of objectives are made at the provincial level. When making government allocations, each level of government has an assigned target in mind; hence, the demand on the subordinate units increases. The result is an accumulation of pressure which creates tension within the system. This is particularly true in the sphere of economic activity. For example, each factory is given a production quota,

---

58. Studies on the Soviet Union can be helpful in an understanding of the subject. Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1953; Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress USSR, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954.

assigned as if it were a political decision. Managers and workers in a factory are concerned with the attainment of the assigned quota, since a failure to meet the quota may bring severe punishment. To fulfill this quota, every means of control and competitive methods are used. This in turn creates additional tension among the workers. Although some factories have issued false achivement reports in order to reduce government demands for ever-increasing production schedules, the regime is making an effort to stamp out this practice.

Pressure and tension are most harmful to the morale of the Party. The Party apparatus is the center of power and activity, and all Party directives and government policies are supervised by the Party. Therefore, a Party member is subject to at least two systems of pressure -- the Party and the state. A Party member is subject to an endless program of Party indoctrination and rectification, which results in the high loss of Party members either through expulsion or forced resignation. Indeed, the demands on a Party member are so great that many Chinese are reluctant to join the Party. The fate of the expelled Party members is unknown, but it is presumed that they are generally tried by a People's Court and sentenced to forced labor. Expelled Party members, if still at large, may form a counterrevolutionary group and join with other elements in subversive activities.

668 578 Tension also exists in the mass organizations as the result of pressure imposed upon them by the Party and by higher organizations themselves. The most active mass organizations, such as the New Democratic Youth Corps and the Federation of Democratic Women, are also the most unstable. The key to the maintenance of a safe margin of tension within an organization seems to lie in a balanced approach to the problem, reinforced by constant vigilance and propaganda.

IV. CONCLUSION

578 656 668 No matter how tight a rein the Communists in the East China Region hold upon the populace, there are always three forces in opposition to the Communist rule of terror: the victims of Communism, the traditional resistance groups, and discontented members of the Communist Party.

Among the victims of Communist power are the landlords, former Kuomintang officials, and those who are named by the Communists as counterrevolutionaries. Although most of these elements are confined to forced labor camps or are placed under the surveillance of the police, they continue to offer some resistance. With the increase in peasant opposition to the Communist policies of gradual collectivism in the rural districts, the "new-rich" peasants may appear in renewed strength. However, in view of the Communist policy of

terrorism and violence, a show of open resistance is infrequent.

The traditional resistance group, represented by the rebirth of secret societies, is another force which will not be easy to crush. Because secret societies are attractive to illiterate peasants and laborers, they may create added discontent. The last group of potential subversives is composed of discontented and/or expelled Party members. Party purges in the East China Region were particularly severe during 1955.

Public discontent and tension within all organizations in East China are by no means an indication of the impending collapse of the Communist regime. They are, rather, the counteraction to be expected under a dictatorship in a controlled society. However, evidences of tension and public discontent should be investigated because they may lead to the weakening of Communist power. The loss of morale and Party unity can mean the disruption of the entire system.

468 1950 and early 1951. These cases were handled by the trade unions in an attempt to satisfy both labor and capital.

IV. DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION

467 In the course of labor organization, 668 the Chinese Communists discovered that many "reactionary and feudalistic elements" still existed in the labor organization, and that the trade union leaders practiced "bureaucratism" and "commandism." Labor bosses in factories were given the title "Number One" in Shanghai and "pa-t'ou" in Tsingtao.[15] The Communists urged the masses to aid in the elimination of reactionary elements, bossism, and remnants of feudalism. To this end, they initiated "democratic reform" in Central-South China in May 1951, and later extended it to other regions. In East China, reform was accelerated in September 1951.

To initiate a "democratic reform" movement in a factory or a mine or among a group of workers, the union cadres called "criticism" and "self-criticism" meetings at which everyone present was urged to make complaints and accusations. The purpose was "to weld together by ties of sympathy and understanding all who work together." After the movement had been established, changes were made in factory regulations and working

15. Gang-labor chiefs had unlimited authority to exploit the workers.

467 668 relations. In the case of textile mills in Shanghai, Tsingtao, Wu-hsi, and Hangchow, the system abolished the practice of searching workers as they left the mills. At the wharves of Shanghai, Tsingtao, Tsinan, the pa-t'ous (labor bosses) were reported to have been eliminated by "democratic reform." In Huai-nan mining district in Anhwei Province, the gang-master system was abolished. But there were also reports of the persistence of bureaucratic practices among trade union cadres. In Shanghai, the deputy chief of the textile workers' trade union encouraged the workers to register complaints by utilizing a suggestion box. One note dropped in the box suggested that the deputy chief change his habit of pounding tables and using abusive language during union meetings. The next day the deputy chief threatened to burn the box if the anonymous writer did not identify himself.[16] This incident suggests that the "Communist spirit" is never as democratic as it has been ordered to be, and that the legislation of equality will have its abuses.

Other campaigns initiated by the Communists included the Resist-American-Aid-Korea Movement, Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement, and Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns. These movements and campaigns were to assist in the political awakening of the workers.

---

16. Chinese Workers' Monthly, September 15, 1950, p. 11.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

IV. COMMENTS

466 668 Despite the fact that the Chinese Communists strongly insist that the laborers employed on the Hwai River Project are working for their own good, the harnessing of the Hwai River has a very strong political factor behind it. Consequently, the indifference and rebellious acts of the people in the Hwai River areas, in the eyes of the Communists, are as dangerous as the evils of the river itself. The harnessing of the river is the harnessing of the people in that area. In the provinces of Shantung, Anhwei, Kiangsu, in East China (and Honan in the Central-South), there were formerly 3,000,000 persons who belonged to different religious sects such as the Hung-ch'iang-hui [Red Spear Society], the I-kuan-tao [Unity Society], the T'ien-ming-tao [Dawn Society], and others. Some of the sects have several hundred years of history and tradition behind them. On many points they did not agree with the tenets of Marxism and Leninism. The cases of peasants refusing to join the Peasants' Associations and sabotaging land reform were too many to handle individually. In addition to the religious differences, the people of the Hwai River basin are famous for their fierceness and obstinacy. The Communist Hwai River Harnessing Project absorbs these unstable millions into the orbit of the Communist system. The military character of the organization of the labor force and the emphasis on the political indoctrination of the

laborers showed very clearly the real intention of the Chinese Communists.

- It is doubtful that the Communists could in a short time brainwash these millions whose ideology was formed by their religious beliefs through many generations. Given a chance, this portion of the Chinese population might rise against the new regime and go back to their old ways of life.

3: Hinder G-5 (1933-1942) 1944 AF15 East China AF15

submitted to the Authorities twice annually, and a union may be dissolved by the Competent Authority in certain circumstances. 467 668

Between 1927 and 1937, when the Kuomintang Government ruled in Nanking, and the Shanghai Chinese City Government was active in the organisation of labour under the Labour Union Law, leftist unions were vigorously suppressed. Hence it appeared that in organising a labour movement, the parties responsible had been concerned at least in part with forging a political instrument.

DURING THE THREE and a half years following the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1937, the organisation of labour saw four distinct phases. The influence of the Kuomintang labour organisation persisted until early in 1940. There were few strikes during the first two years, a period of destruction and recovery, and the Kuomintang organisation had little to do with labour disputes. Early in 1939 an organisation appeared with headquarters outside the Settlement and known as the "Chinese Republic Workers' League," which was associated with disputes in two foreign-owned enterprises in the eastern district in the late summer of 1939. It was dissolved shortly after, and was replaced by the "Chinese Workers' Welfare Association," with an eastern district branch. This organisation was very active, and caused strikes in several undertakings of western ownership. The organisation collected fees from many workers, but after October 1939 ceased to function actively in disputes. These organisations were in fact inspired by Japanese. Every possible means was used to embarrass British and American enterprises.

After June 1939 the influence of labour organisations under several names grew steadily. In November 1939 there arose the "China Labour Movement Association," which for a time confined its activities largely to enterprises in the western district Extra-Settlement area. The first significant dispute with which the Association was involved at this period was a strike among mechanics, conductors and chauffeurs of the China General Omnibus Company, one of the public transportation companies in the Settlement. Its success made it more influential. In June 1939 a first reorganisation took place, after which the "Shanghai General Labour Union" emerged, frankly under the direction of the

3: Hinder G-5 (1933-1942) 1944 AF15 East China AF15

CHAPTER VI

LABOUR ORGANISATION

467
668

COHESION OF INDUSTRIAL labour came late to China—not, in fact, until the 1920's. In 1925 in Shanghai, Hongkong and Canton, workers participated in protracted strikes which had a political, then anti-foreign, character. In 1927, when the Kuomintang armies approached Shanghai from the south, and one month before they entered the city, widespread strikes occurred, an intimation that the organisation of workers had preceded the armies. During the Kuomintang regime in the Shanghai City Government Administration (1927-37) the organisation of labour by the party was steadily pursued.

On October 21, 1929, a Labour Union Law was promulgated by the National Government of China. A careful perusal of the Law indicates that a free development of the labour movement was not contemplated. Granting that labour in China, inexperienced in organisation as it is, cannot easily reach the maturity of western labour movements within a short time, the fact nevertheless remains that the official supervision for which the Law provides suggests that a labour movement developed under its aegis would be carefully controlled. The Law declares that "the Competent Authority of a union shall be the provincial government, or the municipal government . . ." To organise a union "an application in duplicate for registration . . . shall be submitted to the Competent Authority," which "shall give decision within two weeks." "Upon obtaining official sanction for registration, the labour union shall submit to the Competent Authority . . . names, addresses and antecedents of the officers elected." After outlining the permitted functions of a union, the Law states: "If a labour union has not carried out any of the activities of mutual aid . . . the Competent Authority may . . . send a person to assist the labour union in organising such activities."[1] Membership lists must be

[1] Translation by Koo Ping Yuen, in *China's Labor Laws*, Second edition, Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1935.

3: Hinder G-5 (1939-1942) 1944 AF15 East China AF15

467
668

Shanghai Branch of the Social Movement Direction Committee of the Ministry of Social Affairs of the Nanking authorities. Under this master union, the organisation of unions in various trades proceeded. In December 1940 this General Labour Union, together with a body with headquarters in another part of the city and a Workers' Welfare Association, merged in the Shanghai Municipality Labour Movement Adjustment Committee, directed by the Social Movement Direction Committee of the Nanking Ministry of Social Affairs. During the first half of 1941 this Adjustment Committee busied itself with the organisation of labour unions in various industries. These organisations were stimulated by the Nanking Chinese authorities with the dual purpose of increasing their own power and troubling the peace.

It is interesting to note that the new Nanking authorities pursued a course not unlike that of the Kuomintang Government a decade earlier. Labour was regarded by the new regime as a factor in the political movement. Once organised it had to act if the organisation were to retain the interest of the workers. Hence newly formed groups were encouraged by their organisers to initiate a positive programme, in short to present demands. If increased earnings were secured through such united action, the workers would then be bound in gratitude to the group which organised the struggle. The political hold of the responsible party increased over that section of the community which the workers represented.

Thus twice in the space of fourteen years, labour in Shanghai was wooed by a political party. There is no denying the existence of generally unsatisfactory working conditions and inadequate earnings. From this point of view labour should in any case press for improved conditions. Yet the interest of a political party in the welfare of the working classes has had in part a political, not wholly a humanitarian inspiration. A spontaneous self-directed labour movement like that in many western countries did not exist in Shanghai.

The diminution of industrial activity following the outbreak of Pacific hostilities lessened also labour union activity, but it was not eliminated. The Social Movement Direction Committee of the Nanking authorities continued its work and stimulated workers in such trades as continued to flourish, as for example in the leather shoe trade. Here a strong union representation of workers

3: Hinder G-5 (1933-1942) 1944 AF15 East China AF15

was able to obtain through the Division's mediation in August 1942, a collective agreement embodying a minimum monthly pay of CRB$200 whether employees worked or not during slack months when otherwise they would not be able to earn this amount. Unions, too, were active in claiming on behalf of their members adequate discharge allowances. 467 668

It can thus be seen that labour was by no means inarticulate, nor did it necessarily await the stimulation of political groups to lend it cohesion and the power to act in concert. When impelled by a sense of economic needs, workers formulated demands which they pressed upon employers. Leaders emerged to conduct negotiations, often with considerable astuteness, and though in many cases they were almost illiterate, they were often keenly intelligent.

How was the division apprised of imminent industrial unrest? Without compulsory powers to require the submission of a dispute to mediation, it nevertheless arrived at the place where few serious disputes occurred which were not brought to it for settlement. There was a gradual building up of confidence in its fair handling of matters in dispute and one group of satisfied workers passed word to another that application to the Division for mediation would have useful results. Disputes could of course be referred by either party; but as a matter of technique the Division mediated most successfully when workers, not management, presented the request. The reason is obvious: workers may distrust a mediator whose help has been sought by an employer. The Division sometimes waited days after a case was referred by management, in the mean.while trying through other workers whose confidence had been won, to have the workers involved in the dispute request mediation. 468 633

An obvious principle for the Division in mediation was not to break the strength of the workers. If their bargaining power were weakened, the process became not one of mediation between parties of equal strength, but a dictation of its views on the part of a stronger management. This view of the Division did not always correspond with that held by the Municipal police, who also were associated with the settlement of some disputes, usually those where violence or threat of violence had occurred. The police, whose function was primarily to preserve peace and order, 468 633 625